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REVISITING THE JURY SYSTEM IN TEXAS:
A STUDY OF THE JURY POOL IN
DALLAS COUNTY
Ted M. Eades*
The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary
power-to make available the commonsense judgment of the com-
munity as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor
and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or
biased response of a judge. This prophylactic vehicle is not provided
if the jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace
or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool. Commu-
nity participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreo-
ver, is not only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also
critical to public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Restricting jury service to only special groups or excluding
identifiable segments playing major roles in the community cannot
be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial. Trial by jury
presupposes a jury drawn from a pool broadly representative of the
community as well as impartial in a specific case .... [T]he broad
representative character of the jury should be maintained, partly as
assurance of a diffused impartiality and partly because sharing in the
administration of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.'
I. INTRODUCTION
HE American jury system is designed so that litigants-both civil
and criminal-can argue their cases to people drawn from a cross-
section of society. The founding fathers guarded this right because
most citizens were confident that an impartial jury of their peers would
decide cases fairly, at least more so than judges who were instruments of
the state.
Today public confidence in the jury system has waned. Although few
people heard the evidence presented at trial, the public was outraged by
jury verdicts in both the O.J. Simpson and McDonald's hot coffee cases.
And Americans continue to be ashamed of our history of all-white juries
* Ted M. Eades is an Associate of Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP in Dallas, Texas.
He served as editor-in-chief of the SMU Law Review from 1999 to 2000.
1. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530-31 (1975) (citations and quotation marks




condemning African-American defendants. 2 Sometimes the appearance
of justice is as important as justice itself.
In 2000 The Dallas Morning News and the SMU Law Review examined
a list of the people summoned for jury duty in Dallas County and the
resulting venire.3 The study shed light on possible constitutional chal-
lenges to the jury selection process in Dallas County. The purpose of this
article is twofold: (1) to highlight various findings in the study, and (2) to
give an overview of the potential constitutional problems with the jury
selection procedures in Dallas County.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY
In a study conducted by The Dallas Morning News and SMU Law Re-
view, pollsters found that in mid-February 2000, Dallas County officials
mailed out 13,027 summonses in anticipation of the fifty-five civil and
criminal trials scheduled to begin the week of March 6, 2000. An addi-
tional 585 people-not included in the mail-out figure-were expected to
show up at the courthouse because they had answered summonses for
earlier court dates but asked to reschedule to this date. Of the 13,612
who were supposed to show up for jury service, only 2214 did.
Some of the people who did not show up were people who would have
been disqualified anyway because of their age, because they cannot read
or write English, or because they are not legal citizens. But most of the
citizens who did not post simply refused to participate in the jury system.
More than 3,000 summonses were returned unopened because they
could not be delivered, and 1,600 people actually returned their sum-
monses with reasons for why they could not or would not serve. Many
others called the clerk's office to reschedule.
The Dallas Morning News and SMU Law Review decided to focus on
the people who actually showed up to the courthouse ready to serve-
those referred to as the "Shows"-and the people who presumably re-
ceived their summonses but neither showed up nor called to reschedule-
the "No-Shows." The pollsters then randomly selected 401 of the Shows
and 400 of the No-Shows to create an accurate sample of the respective
populations. Dallas County District Attorney Bill Hill gave the No-
Shows who responded immunity from any potential prosecution for fail-
ing to appear for jury duty.4
The results of the study suggest two major problems with the jury selec-
tion process in Dallas County. First, two distinct groups of people are
substantially underrepresented on the venire-Hispanic Americans and
those in low-income households. A possible constitutional challenge to
2. For a fascinating story about one such incident, see generally MARK CURRIDEN &
LEROY PHILLIPS, JR., CONTEMIT OF COURT (1999).
3. "Venire" is the word used today to describe the panel of persons selected for jury
duty and from which the jurors are to be chosen. See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY
OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 909 (Oxford University Press 1995) (1987).
4. We would like to thank Mr. Hill for his support and assistance with this study.
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the jury selection procedures in Dallas County will be addressed in Part
IV.E below. Second, at least 80% of the people summoned each week
for jury duty disregard their summonses and refuse to participate in the
system. Some of the reasons given by the No-Shows for their lack of
participation and their demographics will be examined in Part III below.
III. RESULTS OF THE STUDY
In Powers v. Ohio,5 the court best exemplified the importance of citi-
zens' roles in the jury system by stating:
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards
the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws
by all of the people.... It affords ordinary citizens a valuable oppor-
tunity to participate in a process of government, an experience fos-
tering, one hopes, a respect for the law. . . . Indeed, with the
exception of voting, for most citizens the honor and privilege of jury
duty is their most significant opportunity to participate in the demo-
cratic process.6
If citizens appreciate the honor and privilege of jury duty, then why do
many of them choose not to report for service? Four out of five people
summoned for duty in Dallas County do not show up at the courthouse.7
A. A LOOK AT THE VENIRE
The study suggests that three groups of people are underrepresented
on the venire in Dallas County-young adults (aged 18 to 34), Hispanic
Americans, and those living in households earning less than $35,000 each
year. Thirty-seven percent of Dallas adults are between the ages of 18
and 34,8 but only 8% of the prospective jurors are in that age group.9
Hispanic Americans represent 23% of the population in Dallas County10
but only 9% of the venire. 11 And nearly 40% of people in Dallas County
live in households earning less than $35,000 a year,'12 while just 13% of
jury candidates are in that group.13
B. A LOOK AT THE NO-SHOWS
As part of the study, the participating Shows and No-Shows answered
demographical questions, as well as other questions that delved into the
attitudes of their respective employers toward jury service and the wages
5. 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991).
6. Id. (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
7. See 2000 Study conducted by The Dallas Morning News and SMU Law Review
(hereinafter "DMN/SMULR Study") (on file with the SMU Law Review).
8. See Statistics compiled by the Texas State Data Center at Texas A&M University
and CACI Marketing Systems, Inc. (hereinafter "TSDC and CACI data") (on file with the
SMU Law Review).
9. See DMN/SMULR Study.
10. See TSDC and CACI data.
11. See DMN/SMULR Study.
12. See TSDC and CACI data.
13. See DMN/SMULR Study.
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they received or would have received from their employers had they
served. The answers to these questions may help explain why so many of
these people refused to report for jury duty.
Twice as many Hispanic Americans as Whites, about one in five, re-
sponded that it is difficult to take time off work in order to serve.14
About the same ratio of people earning less than $50,000, about one in
five, also find it difficult to take time off work. 15
One of three Hispanic No-Shows say they do not receive any wages
from their respective employers if they serve on a jury, while only one in
five Whites make the same claim.16 Even more dramatically, 44% of the
No-Shows with annual household incomes of less than $35,000 say they
receive no wages at all from their respective employers if they serve on a
jury.17
In Texas, employers are not required to pay their employees full wages
even though the employee is taking time off work to serve. Furthermore,
jurors who serve are paid only $6 per day, which is the amount it costs to
park at the courthouse. This policy has a disparate impact on racial mi-
norities.18 Even in the group who showed up for jury duty, 17% of Afri-
can-Americans and 19% of Hispanic Americans claim they received no
wages at all from their employers while serving on the jury, while only
5.4% of Whites claim the same thing.19 And in a telling sign, 85.8% of
the Shows received full wages, while only 56.9% of the No-Shows would
have received full wages.20 The No-Shows were three times more likely
than the Shows to receive no wages at all.2 '
The study shows that when people of racial minorities do show up for
jury service, they are pleased with the system. Of the people who
showed, 65.4% of the Hispanic Americans, 55.2% of the African-Ameri-
cans, and 46.6% of the Whites believed that jury service was time well
spent.2 2 Of the Hispanic Americans who reported for duty, 84.6% said
they had faith in the jury system, while only 7.7% of them had very little
faith in the system.23 These data indicate why it is so important to involve





18. In the No-Show group, 51.2% of the Hispanic respondents, 45.1% of the African-
Americans, but only 15.2% of the Whites have an annual household income of less than
$35,000. See id.









One of the fundamental aspects of our justice system is that criminal
defendants have the right to be tried by an impartial jury "of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,...."24 It has
long been recognized that this means a jury representative of the commu-
nity as a whole.25 "For racial discrimination to result in the exclusion
from jury service of otherwise qualified groups not only violates our Con-
stitution and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic con-
cepts of a democratic society and a representative government. ' 26 But
what happens if a jury does not truly represent the community?
A defendant may bring an action challenging the jury selection process.
Although he cannot expect an exact reflection of the community in his
jury of twelve, he can expect the venire, the pool of people from which
the twelve will be selected, to be a true reflection of the community.
27 If
the venire does not mirror the community, the defendant has two ways to
challenge it: (1) on equal protection grounds, under the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for state juries or under the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment for federal juries; or (2) on
grounds that a violation of the fair-cross-section-of-society requirement
found in the Sixth Amendment has occurred.
The study suggests that two groups in particular are underrepresented
on the Dallas County venire-Hispanic Americans and low-income peo-
ple. The venire thus does not reflect the community as a whole, and if the
legislature in Texas does not act to reform the jury selection process, Dal-
las County could be open to challenge under the U.S. Constitution. Jury
selection procedures in Texas have faced many constitutional challenges
in the past.28
B. TEST FOR AN EQUAL PROTECTION VIOLATION
Ordinarily, equal protection challenges are brought by criminal defend-
ants. To bring a challenge to the jury selection procedures on equal pro-
tection grounds, a defendant must meet the following elements of the
requisite prima facie case. First, he must "establish that the group [to
which he belongs] is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out
for different treatment under the laws, as written or applied. '29 Second,
he must prove "by comparing the proportion of the group in the total
24. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
25. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (footnote omitted) ("It is part of the
established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a
body truly representative of the community.").
26. Id.
27. See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 (1990).
28. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Carter v.
Texas, 177 U.S. 442 (1900).
29. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977).
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population to the proportion called to serve" as jurors the degree of un-
derrepresentation. 30 Third, he must show that the selection procedure "is
susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral," which is supported by "the
presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing. '31
Once the defendant has demonstrated the elements of a prima facie
case, he has raised an inference of a discriminatory purpose.32 The bur-
den then shifts to the State to rebut the case. To rebut the defendant's
prima facie case, the State must proffer evidence that shows a "discrimi-
natory purpose was not involved or that such purpose did not have a
determinative effect." 33
Two other ways exist to challenge an equal protection violation caused
by underrepresentation of certain groups in jury wheels. A criminal de-
fendant who is not a member of the underrepresented group may be able
to bring an action on behalf of a third party. In addition, members of the
underrepresented group may challenge the venire despite the fact that
they are not on trial.
Under Castaneda v. Partida,34 a defendant who wishes to raise an equal
protection challenge must be a member of the underrepresented group.
But some courts have allowed defendants to raise equal protection chal-
lenges on behalf of third parties, those members of society who have been
excluded from jury service. 35 Most of the courts allowing this have de-
cided that the Supreme Court left room for these arguments in Peters v.
Kiff. 3 6 It can be argued that the Court settled this issue in Powers v.
Ohio.37 In Powers, the Court decided that a criminal defendant has
standing to object to the prosecution's use of peremptory strikes to ex-
clude members of a race even though the defendant does not belong to
that race. 38 The Court set forth the requirements needed to assert a
third-party claim in the following way:
We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of
third parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: The liti-
gant must have suffered an injury in fact, thus giving him or her a
sufficiently concrete interest in the outcome of the issue in dis-
pute.... the litigant must have a close relation to the third party,...
and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to
protect his or her own interests. 39
30. Id. (Although Castaneda involved the selection of grand jurors, the argument ap-
plies equally to the selection of petit jurors.)
31. Id.
32. Id. at 495.
33. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 368 n.26 (1979).
34. 430 U.S. at 494.
35. See Peter A. Detre, Note, A Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in the
Composition of the Jury Wheel, 103 YALE L.J. 1913, 1924 n.58 (1994).
36. Id. See also Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
37. Id. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 411 (1991). See also Mata v. Johnson, 99 F.3d 1261,
1269 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating "a litigant need not be of the same race as the excluded jurors
to have standing to champion their rights.").
38. See Powers, 499 U.S. at 416.
39. Id. at 410-11 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
1818 [Vol. 54
JURY STUDY
The Court held that the first criterion was met because the prosecu-
tion's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges caused the defendant
"cognizable injury," and the defendant had a "concrete interest" in chal-
lenging the practice. 40 The reasoning behind the Court's decision is that
"racial discrimination in the selection of jurors casts doubt on the integ-
rity of the judicial process, . and places the fairness of a criminal pro-
ceeding in doubt."' A criminal defendant attempting to bring an equal
protection claim on behalf of a third party who was excluded from the
jury wheel at the beginning of the jury selection process could argue that
the first criterion was also met in his case based upon the same reasoning.
The second criterion-a close relationship between the defendant and
the third party-was met in Powers because the defendant was "as effec-
tive a proponent of the right as the [third party], . . .[b]oth the excluded
juror and the criminal defendant ha[d] a common interest in eliminating
racial discrimination from the courtroom, . . ." both might otherwise have
"los[t] confidence in the court and its verdicts .... [a]nd, there can be no
doubt that [the defendant would] be a motivated, effective advocate for
the excluded venirepersons' rights."'42 The same reasoning would apply
in the case of a criminal defendant attempting to bring a cause of action
on behalf of a member of a race systematically excluded from jury service
by being underrepresented on the venire.
Finally, the third criterion in Powers was met because, although a po-
tential juror has the right to bring suit on his own behalf, these cases are
rare.43 The barriers to these types of suits are "daunting"-the potential
juror has no opportunity to be heard at the time of exclusion, and the
financial burden of litigation far outweighs the financial stake involved.44
Again, the same reasoning would apply to a defendant bringing an equal
protection challenge on behalf of a person systematically excluded from
the jury pool.
A third alternative for equal protection challenges is as follows. Mem-
bers of a group systematically excluded from the jury venire, even though
they are not the ones on trial, may bring a cause of action. For example,
40. Id. at 411. But see Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, 499 U.S. at 426-27, in which
he states:
Today's opinion makes a mockery of [the injury-in-fact] requirement. It does
not even pretend that the peremptory challenges here have caused this de-
fendant tangible injury and concrete harm-but rather (with careful selection
of both adjectives and nouns) only a "cognizable injury," producing a "con-
crete interest in challenging the practice." .... I have no doubt he now has a
cognizable injury; the Court has made it true by saying so. And I have no
doubt he has a concrete interest in challenging the practice at issue here; he
would have a concrete interest in challenging a mispronunciation of one of
the jurors' names, if that would overturn his conviction. But none of this has
anything to do with injury in fact.
Id. at 427 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
41. Id. at 411 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Powers, 499 U.S. at 413-14.
43. See id. at 414.
44. Id. at 414-15.
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in Berry v. Cooper, black and female residents of Peach County, Georgia,
filed a class action lawsuit claiming that they had been excluded from jury
service based upon their race and gender.45 They asked the district court
to declare that the grand and petit juror lists were unconstitutionally com-
posed, to enjoin their use, and to order new lists prepared.4 6 State judges
had ordered new lists to be prepared, and the federal district court or-
dered the defendants to comply with these orders. After the defendants
complied with the orders, plaintiffs again filed suit claiming that the re-
vised lists were unconstitutionally composed. The district court found
that although the revised lists might not have remedied the intentional
discrimination, the plaintiffs, by showing nothing more than statistical un-
derrepresentation, failed to prove intentional discrimination.4 7 The Fifth
Circuit reversed the district court, citing Castaneda v. Partida for the pro-
position that statistical evidence is sufficient to establish a discriminatory
purpose.48
C. TEST FOR A SIXTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION
In Glasser v. United States, the Supreme Court said that the selection of
jurors must "comport with the concept of the jury as a cross-section of the
community. '4 9 Unfortunately the Court has never addressed exactly how
this ideal should be accomplished.
In 1968 Congress passed the Jury Selection and Service Act (JSSA),50
which codified the fair cross-section requirement. Congress declared, "It
is the policy of the United States that all litigants in Federal courts enti-
tled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries selected
at random from a fair cross section of the community in the district or
division wherein the court convenes." 5' And, "No citizen shall be ex-
cluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts of the
United States ... on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
or economic status."'5 2 Although the JSSA applies to the federal courts
only, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is required in the state courts as
well.5 3
45. 577 F.2d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1978).
46. See id.
47. See id. at 327.
48. See id.
49. 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942). See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 528 (1975) ("'The
unmistakable import of this Court's opinions, at least since 1940 ... and not repudiated by
intervening decisions, is that the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section
of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.")
50. The Jury Selection and Service Act, Pub. L. No. 90-274, § 101, 82 Stat. 54 (1968)
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869 (1994)).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1994).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1994).
53. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) ("Because we believe that trial byjury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice, we hold that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a right of jury trial in all criminal cases which-were




In 1979 the Court set forth a three-part test, for proving a violation of
the fair-cross-section requirement. 54
[T]o establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section re-
quirement, the defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be
excluded is a "distinctive" group in the community; (2) that the rep-
resentation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is
not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in
the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to sys-
tematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.55
"[O]nce the defendant has made a prima facie showing of an infringe-
ment of his constitutional right to a jury drawn from a fair cross section of
the community," the burden shifts to the State to "justify[ ] this infringe-
ment by showing attainment of a fair cross section to be incompatible
with a significant state interest. ' 56
D. APPLYING THE TESTS GENERALLY
The two tests outlined in Parts IV.B and IV.C above are similar in ap-
plication. Two major differences are (1) an equal-protection claimant
must demonstrate intentional discrimination, and (2) the equal-protec-
tion test requires an examination of the alleged underrepresentation over
a significant period of time.5 7 For these reasons, claimants generally find
it easier to bring an action under the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-sec-
tion requirement. But in some circumstances claimants find it wiser to
bring equal-protection challenges, either because they desire the different
mathematical criteria that some courts have imposed for determining
what constitutes substantial underrepresentation, or because it is the only
way to challenge successfully the jury selection process when filing on
behalf of a third party or on their own behalf when they are not
litigants.5 8
1. Defining a Distinctive Group
Both the equal protection and Sixth Amendment tests share the same
first element. The group of people allegedly excluded from jury service
must be "sufficiently numerous and distinct,"5 9 and must be recognizable
as a class of people singled out for different treatment "not based on
some reasonable classification." 60 The Court notes that race and color
are easily identifiable groups, but "community prejudices are not static,
and from time to time other differences from the community norm may
define other groups which need the same protection."'61 Groups that the
54. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 368.
57. See Timmel v. Phillips, 799 F.2d 1083, 1083 n.1 (5th Cir. 1986).
58. See Detre, supra note 34, at 1916.
59. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 531 (1975).




Court has recognized as distinct include Hispanic Americans, 62 African-
Americans, 63 groups defined by gender,64 economic status, 65 and other
classifications. 66
2. Measuring Underrepresentation
Courts have employed four different methods of measuring under-
representation. 67 The most common method is absolute disparity. The
Court itself used absolute disparity in determining underrepresentation in
both Castaneda v. Partida68 and Duren v. Missouri.69 In order to calcu-
late absolute disparity, the percentage of representation of a distinct
group on the venire is subtracted from the percentage of representation
of the group in the population as a whole. 70 For example, if women com-
prise 50% of the population but only 35% of the venire, then the absolute
disparity is 15%. Although this is a simple calculation to make, some
commentators and advocates have argued that this measure is not an ac-
curate reflection of the potential problem. 71 If Native Americans, for in-
stance, represent 5% of the population but are totally excluded from jury
service, the absolute disparity is only 5%. Therefore, when the distinct
group in question is a relatively small minority of the population, the re-
sulting absolute disparity calculation underestimates the effect of the al-
leged systematic exclusion.
A second measure of underrepresentation is absolute impact. To calcu-
late absolute impact, multiply the absolute disparity by the size of the
panel in question. 72 Using the absolute disparity of 15% in the example
above, if the venire includes sixty people, then the absolute impact of the
jury selection procedures is nine. That is, if the percentage of women on
the venire was an accurate reflection of the population, then it would
include nine more women than it does now. This measure has the same
drawbacks as absolute disparity; in fact, absolute impact is merely an-
other way to look at absolute disparity.
A third measure of underrepresentation is comparative disparity. This
measure is calculated by dividing the absolute disparity figure by the per-
centage of the group in the overall population, then multiplying that re-
sult by 100%.73 If Native Americans represent 5% of the population but
only 1% of the venire, then the comparative disparity is 80% (4% divided
62. See id. at 479-80; Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977).
63. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-309 (1880).
64. See Taylor, 419 U.S. at 531.
65. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
66. See id. ("[P]rospective jurors shall be selected by court officials without systematic
and intentional exclusion of any of these [economic, social, religious, racial, political, and
geographical] groups.").
67. See Detre, supra note 34, at 1917.
68. 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977).
69. 439 U.S. 357, 365-66 (1979).
70. See Detre, supra note 34, at 1917.





by 5%, multiplied by 100%). This measure is sometimes flawed in that it
tends to overestimate the damage caused by jury selection procedures
that for whatever reason exclude a tiny minority from jury service.74
The fourth measure that has been mentioned by some courts is the
statistical decision theory (SDT).75 The SDT method, which is generally
calculated by using the binomial distribution, reflects the probability that
the underrepresentation of the distinct group was the result of chance.76
Although this method has been mentioned as a possible means of mea-
suring underrepresentation, it is rarely used.77
No matter which measure is employed to determine the effect of the
underrepresentation, a number of other problems exist. First, how is the
composition of the population determined? Courts typically examine
United States Census Bureau data.78 Although this is probably the most
accurate information available, some argue that minority figures are not
fairly reflected in the census numbers.79 A second problem is whether
the percentage of a group on a panel should be compared to the popula-
tion as a whole or to the population eligible to serve as jurors. The Cas-
taneda and Duren courts compared the representation to the census data,
which reflect the population as a whole. But other courts have refused to
follow.80 It makes sense to compare the group on the venire to the popu-
lation of eligible jurors, but as a practical matter, unless one of the parties
to the action can prove the composition of eligible jurors, the Census Bu-
reau is the most accurate, readily available source of data.
A third concern in measuring underrepresentation is the period of time
over which the underrepresentation must occur. Generally, the require-
ment to prove the second element of both the equal protection and Sixth
Amendment tests is the same. But here, the two tests diverge. Under the
Castaneda equal protection test, "the degree of underrepresentation must
be proved ... over a significant period of time. '81 This requirement is
not found in the Duren fair cross-section test. Claimants may be able to
prove, presumably, a degree of underrepresentation over a much shorter
span of time in those cases. But some courts suggest that claimants need
to have evidence that spans at least some time, otherwise they fail to meet
the third element of the fair cross-section test, which is the systematic
74. See id. at 1921-22.
75. See id. at 1918.
76. See Detre, supra note 26, at 1918.
77. See id. at 1922-23.
78. See, e.g., Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977); Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 364-65 (1974); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 627 (1972); Hernandez v.
Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 480 n.12 (1954).
79. See Cynthia A. Williams, Jury Source Representativeness and the Use of Voter Re-
gistration Lists, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 590, 605-06 (1990).
80. See United States v. Brummitt, 665 F.2d 521, 529 (5th Cir. 1981) ("[T]he disparity
between the proportion of members of an identifiable class on a jury list must be based not
on total population but, instead, on those of the identifiable class who are eligible to serve
as jurors.") (emphasis in original).
81. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494.
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exclusion requirement. 82 Unfortunately, the Court has never addressed
what time span is sufficient in each case.
Finally, the most important question is what constitutes "substantial"
underrepresentation. In Swain v. Alabama,83 the Supreme Court held
that a showing that an identifiable group in a community is under-
represented by as much as 10% is not enough to prove purposeful dis-
crimination under an equal protection examination. A strong argument
can be made that this 10% floor should not apply to Sixth Amendment
cases, 84 but most courts, even if they distinguish between the two tests,
use the floor in either case. 85
The Castaneda Court found a 40% disparity was enough to establish a
prima facie case of an equal protection violation. 86 But the Court has
never set forth a bright-line test-only that "substantial" under-
representation lies somewhere between 10% and 40% absolute disparity.
The Court has found, however, that a 14.7% absolute disparity was
sufficient. 87
3. Proffering Evidence of Intentional or Systematic Exclusion
To prevail on an equal protection claim, a claimant must prove inten-
tional discrimination. A discriminatory purpose may be presumed by a
showing of statistical evidence, but the State has an opportunity to rebut
the presumption by demonstrating that a discriminatory purpose was not
involved.
Claimants generally find Sixth Amendment claims easier to argue.
Here the claimant need not show intentional discrimination but only sys-
tematic exclusion. This can be shown by examining the composition of
the weekly venire over a period of time, which in Duren was "nearly" a
year.88 Once the examination "indicates that the cause of the under-
representation [is] systematic-that is, inherent in the particular jury-se-
82. See, e.g., McGinnis v. Johnson, 181 F.3d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting Timmel
v. Phillips, 799 F.2d 1083, 1087 (5th Cir. 1986)) ("We have held that 'one incidence of a jury
venire being disproportionate is not evidence of a 'systematic' exclusion' .... Therefore, 'a
one-time example of underrepresentation of a distinctive group wholly fails to meet the
systematic exclusion element in Duren.",).
83. 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965). This case was overturned by Batson v. Kentucky on
other grounds. See 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986). The test for representativeness still stands. See
id.
84. See Williams, supra note 78, at 611.
85. See id.; United States v. Maskeny, 609 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1980) ("Thus, while
the [Duren] Court stated that statistical evidence is used to prove different elements in
equal protection and sixth amendment claims, it did not indicate that the necessary amount
of disparity itself would differ.").
86. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495-96 (1977).
87. See Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 25 (1967). But see United States v. Brummitt,
665 F.2d 521, 527 (51h Cir. 1981) (rejecting argument that a 19.6% disparity "between the
percentage of Hispanics in the total population and the percentage of Hispanics in the
Master Jury List result[ed] from the fact that prospective jurors [were] chosen solely from
the voter registration lists and that Mexican-Americans traditionally register to vote in
fewer numbers than do other recognizable groups").
88. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 366 (1979).
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lection process utilized,"8 9 then the State "bears the burden of justifying
this infringement [of claimant's constitutional right to a jury drawn from a
fair cross section of the community] by showing attainment of a fair cross
section to be incompatible with a significant state interest." 90
E. APPLYING THE TESTS IN DALLAS COUNTY
In Dallas County, the jury selection procedures may be challenged in
one of four ways. First, a person from a low-income household or a His-
panic American could bring a class-action lawsuit challenging a violation
of his or her equal protection rights.91 Second, a litigant could raise an
equal protection claim on behalf of a third-party member of an excluded
group. Third, a litigant who is a member of one of the excluded groups
could raise an equal protection challenge himself. And fourth, a litigant,
whether or not a member of one of the excluded groups, could claim a
Sixth Amendment violation.
Under both the Castaneda and Duren tests, the first two elements are
relatively the same. The first hurdle required to establish a prima facie
claim under either approach is to prove that the members who have alleg-
edly been excluded are a sufficiently numerous and distinct group. The
Supreme Court has already identified Hispanic Americans as a distinct
group.92 Low-income wage earners have also been identified as a distinct
group.9 3
The second hurdle is to demonstrate that these two groups are substan-
tially underrepresented. The best way to do this is to compare Census
Bureau data to the percentage of each group represented by the venire.
It is important to recognize that the statistics set forth in this article are
not official Census Bureau figures. The figures used in this article are
estimates, and because the study examined only one week's venire, these
numbers will probably not be sufficient to raise a constitutional challenge.
The numbers in this study are important, however, because they reflect
an estimate of the actual population and venire compositions.
Because Hispanic Americans represent 23% of the population in Dal-
las County but only 9% of the venire, the absolute disparity of Hispanic
Americans is 14%. The absolute disparity of low-income individuals is
27%. If these numbers are supported by official Census Bureau data and
the composition of the venire over a sufficient length of time, a court
could find these disparities substantial.94
89. Id.
90. Id. at 368.
91. Although the study shows that young adults are significantly underrepresented in
Dallas County, the Supreme Court has never identified this as a distinctive class.
92. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) ("[I]t is no longer open to dis-
pute that Mexican-Americans are a clearly identifiable class.")
93. See Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946) (holding that jury commissioners
could not systematically exclude daily wage earners from the venire).




Facing the third hurdle, in an equal protection claim, the claimant must
establish that these groups are intentionally discriminated against. In a
Sixth Amendment claim, the claimant need show only a systematic exclu-
sion. Dallas County officials can argue that they use voter registration
and driver's license lists to randomly select who will be summoned. It
will be difficult for a claimant to overcome this evidence in an equal pro-
tection case.
A Dallas County claimant will find it easier to bring a Sixth Amend-
ment claim. An examination of the weekly venire will show that juries in
Dallas County are not drawn from a cross-section of the community.
Something in the system is inherently wrong, and is excluding distinct
groups from the venire. The rules in Texas, such as paying jurors only $6
per day, make it so financially onerous that low income people cannot
afford to fulfill their civic duty. While Dallas County officials may have
an easy time showing that they do not intentionally discriminate against
these groups, they will have a much more difficult time demonstrating a
significant state interest that would justify this infringement.
In a class action challenge, members of either of these two groups
could request a preliminary injunction enjoining Dallas County officials
from using the existing jury selection procedures. It should be argued
that the courts are under a duty to ensure that everyone is entitled to a
jury drawn from a cross-section of society.
The statutory prohibition on discrimination in the selection of jurors,
18 U.S.C. § 243, enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment's En-
forcement Clause, makes race neutrality in jury selection a visible, and
inevitable, measure of the judicial system's own commitment to the com-
mands of the Constitution. The courts have an affirmative duty to en-
force the strong statutory and constitutional policies embodied in that
prohibition. 95
This would be a difficult challenge, though, because of the intentional
discrimination requirement found in the equal protection cases.
V. CONCLUSION
The Dallas County jury system is primed for a constitutional challenge.
Although the intent of the officials operating the jury wheel may not be
to discriminate, the reality is that at least two distinct groups are being
excluded from the weekly venire. Something inherent in the design of
the system causes large numbers of people to stay home. Commentators
have suggested many ways to improve participation. 96 Some states, for
example, Arizona and New York, have radically reformed their jury sys-
tems. The legislature in Texas should be proactive and not risk the
chance that they will be forced to act under court order.
95. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991).
96. See Akhil Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1169 (1995); Albert W. Alschuler, Racial Quotas and the Jury, 44 DUKE L.J. 704
(1995); Hiroshi Fukurai & Edgar W. Butler, Sources of Racial Disenfranchisement in the
Jury and Jury Selection System, 13 NAT'L BLACK L.J. 238 (1994).
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